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1 Introduction 
At the end of the 90’s, Québec’s government modified the institutional structure of the Montreal 
metropolitan region. Those changes led to the creation of the Communauté Métropolitaine de 
Montréal in 2001 and to the amalgamation of municipalities around Montreal, Longueuil and 
Terrebonne. After the election of a new government in 2003, a demerger process was initiated by 
the provincial government 1 leading in 2006 to the demerger of some municipalities on the Island 
of Montreal and the South Shore (in Longueuil), as well as the creation of agglomeration 
councils. The main goal of the first reform was to ensure a higher level of cohesion in the 
production of local public services in the metropolitan area all the while assuring the 
consolidation of the central city (Sancton, 2003); however, with the second reform, the 
institutional structure ended up almost as decentralized as it originally was. As mentioned by 
Sancton (2005), the amalgamation and the de-amalgamation made the arrangements for the 
governance of Montreal quite complex and unique, thus making it an interesting topic for further 
study. 
This research evaluates how municipal institutional changes have affected the fiscal equity and 
efficiency in the production of local public services in the Montreal metropolitan region between 
1996 and 2011. Firstly, we estimate the convergence of the fiscal effort between municipalities in 
the area considering three periods: the pre-merged, the merged and the post-merged periods. 
Secondly, the efficiency is subjected to a short analysis considering municipalities’ spending. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/organisation-municipale/historique/presentation/ 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Regionalism and Localism 
There are currently several academic papers on local public finance that are interested in 
institutional reforms and metropolitan governance. As noted by Hamilton et al. (2004) or Jiminez 
and Hendrick (2010), there is an ongoing debate between regionalists, in favour of metropolitan 
consolidation, and localists, who promote fragmentation. Both make use of models with 
similarities, but their underlying hypotheses differ. Moreover, empirical results are also 
inconclusive; depending on the context, they can be said to support both theories (Hendrick and 
al, 2011). 
Most recent studies in the field of the economic impacts of consolidation or fragmentation of 
local governments examine cities in the United States. Only a few such studies concern 
themselves with cities in Canada (Sancton 2000; Kushner and Siegel 2005). Only one of those 
examines Montreal’s case. It is described in the next sub-section. 
Two arguments are generally evoked to justify the implementation of a coordination structure at 
the regional level (Sharp, 1995). The first is that it enhances efficiency in the production of local 
public goods and services, and the second is that it improves fiscal equity.  
Different methods of metropolitan coordination exist in Canada, from municipal mergers to the 
addition of a supra-municipal level (Sancton, 2005). In the wake of the merger’s failure, central-
city decentralization and the addition of multiple administrative levels, like the MMC and the 
agglomeration councils, have increased the weight of bureaucracy in the production of local 
public services (Delorme, 2009). A direct consequence of this is a loss of efficiency. 
It is not easy to ascertain the exact measure of the production of local public goods and services, 
because many of these services do not have market values. Hence, it is hard to evaluate the 
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production level or the productivity and its efficiency. When data is available, research can make 
use of the theory of microeconomics with the measure of the transformation of local input into 
local output (Agonso and Fernandes, 2007). However, this data is not available for the Montreal 
Metropolitan region. Then again, it is possible to study specific categories of spending per capita, 
like the total or administrative spending, or the ratio of the administrative spending to total 
spending, in order to measure the efficiency. Therefore, we make the assumption that the 
variation of efficiency can be reflected and measured indirectly by the variation of the 
administrative and total spending. We have to keep in mind that it is a very narrow measure of a 
real variation of productivity and therefore be careful with the interpretation and conclusions we 
might draw. Over the years following the mergers and demergers, the media and some political 
parties have often reported an excessive administration cost attributable to the modification and 
addition of entities in the municipal structure of Montreal; they are described in the next section. 
Their argument was that there are too many structures to efficiently manage the municipality, 
thus increases the administrative spending come into play, and this consequently increases the 
property tax to finance this specific spending, and not for public local goods and services. Thus, 
we will attempt to verify whether the merger or the demerger have had an impact on the size of 
the administrative spending in proportion to the total municipalities’ budget. 
Equity is the second argument supporting the consolidation of metropolitan regions. A formal 
definition of equity in a local government is a fiscal arrangement that imposes equal liabilities on 
people who have the same ability to pay (Rosen and al, 1999). Moreover, the concept itself can 
be interpreted in many ways. The equity between territories doesn’t necessarily imply equity 
between individuals (Estèbe, 2004). In our study, we will focus on the equity between 
municipalities. Same as for efficiency, it’s almost impossible to measure equity directly. In our 
attempt to do so, we compare an innovative equity index taking into consideration the fiscal 
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burden and the total spending per capita between municipalities, which will be explained in the 
third section. In the literature, the fiscal burdens are generally for the total amount of tax paid by 
a person, but it can apply to a part of the public sector, the local government in our case, and can 
be defined as the burden of the entire local residential and business taxes. In the province of 
Quebec, it is the standardized global taxation rate (TGTU); that concept will be explained in 
section 3. More generally, the taxes are separated by payers for analysis; business or residential. 
Slack and Bird (2012) have found that amalgamation likely equalises the service level between 
municipalities, despite the fact that it implies an increase of the cost of providing public local 
services. Hence, it may be more expensive, yet it leads to a more equal supply of services. In this 
section, we try to verify whether the spending becomes more similar or not in the context of the 
merger and the demerger. The same authors found that in the region of Toronto, the 
amalgamation led to a reduction of the residential property taxes, but the question of the 
distribution of fiscal burden was not addressed.  
As stated by the mayor of Montreal at the end of the 90’s, the goal of the mergers was to re-
equilibrate the finances between his city and its neighbouring suburbs (Sancton, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the same argument was used for the demerger later on. However, it is interesting to 
consider how fiscal disparities evolved through the structural changes that occurred in Montreal 
metropolitan region between 1996 and 2011.  
2.2 Structure of Municipalities in the Montreal Area 
2.2.2 History 
Sancton(2003) clearly explains the context of the structural changes in Montreal. The mayor 
Pierre Bourque, in power from 1994 to 2001, was in favour of mergers and thus played a 
significant role in the amalgamation of the city. He was more or less the only mayor of a city 
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subject to amalgamation that was in agreement with such an idea. He worked hard to make the 
merger happen, but suburbs were resisting, and for some municipalities (Westmount, for 
example), it was linked to the sensitive issues of linguistic minorities. Although there were 
protests, the mergers were implemented by a provincial law voted by the national assembly as put 
forward by the government of the Party Québécois in 2001(Bill 170). Because of that, it was 
impossible for all concerned municipalities to avoid amalgamation. Lucien Bouchard, the prime 
minister at the time, has pointed to the benefits of equalizing taxes and services across the new 
city (Sancton, 2003).  
The municipal reform was implemented on January 1st, 2002. Later, in April of 2003, the Liberal 
Party of Quebec won the election with aid of the promise to hold citizen consultations on the 
territorial reorganization. Those consultations could allow, under certain conditions, to demerge 
some of the municipality. The first condition was that, within the former municipal borders, 10% 
of the registered voters had to sign a register supporting holding a demerger vote. The second was 
that a majority vote in favor of demerging representing at least 35% of the registered voter had to 
be reached in a referendum to lead to a demerger. Even though 282 municipalities organised a 
referendum in 2004 (because they met the first condition), and 22 had a result of a majority of 
voters for demergers, only193 municipalities in the metropolitan area recovered their independent 
status on January 1st 2006 (meeting the second condition), 15 on the Island of Montreal an 4 on 
the South Shore, around Longueuil.  
Since then, no municipality has demerged. Hence, that gives us three distinct periods to study 
from 1996 to 2011. The first comprises the initial situation, where no municipality has merged or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/organisation-municipale/historique/consultation-sur-la-reorganisation-
territoriale/registres/tableau-cumulatif/ 
3 http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Dossiers/defusions/referendums/resultats/regions.asp?region=1 
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demerged yet (1996-2001); the second is when all municipalities were merged (2002-2005), and 
the last is when some were still merged, while and others have demerged (2006-2011).  
2.2.1 Research 
One of the few analyses of the consolidation or fragmentation of municipalities in Montreal 
metropolitan area was carried out by Collin and Hamel (1993). This paper tries to identify 
fundamental differences, if any, between municipalities in their budgetary choices. At that time, 
the reforms of 1978-1980 had given municipalities in Quebec full decisional power over their tax 
rates and budget spending, so each one could provide a different supply of goods and services. 
This reform was in line with the Tiebout Model, where citizens are considered to vote with their 
feet (Tiebout, 1956). This model suggests that when a person is in the process of choosing a 
community where to live, the amount of public services provided by the local government and 
the matching tax rate will be chosen to match his/her preference pattern. The conclusion of the 
analysis of Collin and Hamel (1993) is that no voluntary budgetary differentiation is found in the 
Grand Montreal area between the 136 municipalities studied. Various reasons have been cited. 
First, unlike most American cities, Québec’s municipalities don’t have any power on social 
services and are highly constrained by Quebec school board on education, and hence cannot 
modify the supply of public goods and services in these fields as they wish. Second, the 
municipal fragmentation was a result of many factors, but also, most significantly, historical 
choices. Hence, we can conclude that despite the fact that the merging process can improve or 
deteriorate public local government’s finances, the choice can be based on different criteria. 
According to Collin and Hamel (1993), municipalities do not have the power to change their 
supply of services.  
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2.3 Convergence 
The fiscal convergence breaks away from Tiebout (1956) to borrow its foundation from the 
economic convergence theory, usually linked to economic growth (Magrini, 2004). An 
incorporation of a measurement of fiscal effort replacing economic growth in these models makes 
it possible, from an equity perspective, to measure the effects of institutional changes that 
happened in Montreal in the 2000’s.  
According to Annala (2003), state and local fiscal policies have converged over the past 20 years 
in the USA. Fiscal convergence refutes the Tiebout hypothesis stating that policies must 
differentiate over time to provide the right amount of goods and services to the local population. 
This article tests whether the fiscal policies among the USA states are becoming increasingly 
similar. This is achieved by testing both beta and sigma convergence, and it appears that there is 
evidence of convergence. 
In the same line of thought, Skidmore and Deller (2008) build a model, which is consistent with 
macroeconomic growth, which predicts convergence in government spending. The idea is that 
government activity can be viewed as a certain type of investment, and similar to private 
investment, they have decreasing marginal returns. Hence, a big local government will get a 
lower return on spending than a small local government. Holding that assumption and variables 
of the model constant, higher levels of past government spending will lead to a slower rate of 
growth in current government spending and vice versa. In other words, government spending will 
converge over time. There exist a few reasons why it must converge. First, it has been shown that 
local government spending decisions are influenced by decisions made by nearby communities 
(Besley and Case, 1995). Second, intergovernmental transfers from state to local governments 
may accentuate the convergence; the state transfers a bigger amount to poor communities with 
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low spending and a smaller one to rich and spendthrift communities. In reality, this may be the 
case in the USA, but in the province of Quebec, municipalities finance themselves trough local 
taxes and have a small range of activities compared to their southern neighbours; consequently, 
this effect may not play a significant role in our study. In the United States, local governments 
rely on other governments for 40% of their revenue and most of government at the State level has 
the control over the source of revenue of the local government (Chernick and al., 2011). In the 
province of Québec, the municipalities obtain from transfers only 8% of their revenue.4 
The first convergence measure used is the σ-convergence from Quah (1993). This convergence 
considers the dynamics of the distribution of the income level per capita and its distribution 
across countries. The idea behind this convergence is, in fact, quite simple; we observe the 
evolution of the coefficient of variation (CV). The CV gives a ratio of the standard-variation and 
the average. The value of the CV is directly proportional to the spread of the distribution around 
the average. . Therefore, the variation from year to year can indicate whether there is a 
convergence. The σ-convergence has been used to study the distribution of some fiscal variables 
in previous papers but not from a local point of view (see Table 1).  
The second measure used is the β-convergence, taken from Baumol (1986) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992). Baumol used a growth regression with the initial level of income as the 
explanatory variable of the growth rate of the GDP per capita. A negative correlation between the 
initial income and growth implies a tendency for poor countries to catch up. This concept has 
been applied to fiscal convergence analysis in previous studies, but not to local fiscal effort 
(Table 1). The rate of the β-convergence is obtained by regressing the initial value of the fiscal 
effort on the growth rate of the fiscal effort of a given period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4http://www.mamrot.gouv.qc.ca/pub/finances_indicateurs_fiscalite/information_financiere/publications_electronique
s/2011/rapports_org_muni/C1_Munloc_RF2011_Sommation.pdf 
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Table 1: Summary of research on fiscal convergence. 
Authors and 
years Object Region and Years σ-convergence β-convergence 
Esteve and al. 
(2000) 
Total fiscal 
pressure 
6 OCDE countries 
1967-1994 
Yes 2,4% convergence 
rate 
Sosvilla and 
al. (2001) 
EU tax burden Europe 1967-1995 Yes for 67-74 
and 84-95 
1,6%-2,5% 
convergence rate 
Annala 
(2003) 
Real per capita tax 
revenue 
States of U.S. Yes 1,35%-1,85% 
convergence rate 
Gemmel and 
Kneller 
(2003) 
Gini coefficient 
for total fiscal 
pressure 
10 European 
countries 1970-
1995 
Yes Yes 
Delgado 
(2006) 
Tax mix and fiscal 
pressure 
Europe 1965-2004 Yes, mostly 75-
90 
Yes, depending on 
the benchmark 
Delgado and 
Presno (2007) 
Fiscal pressure Europe-15 1965-
1004 
Yes, from 0,23 
to 0,14 
Yes, depending on 
the benchmark 
Source: Table made by the author.  
 
In our study we use these same concepts of convergence, but with a computed measure of fiscal 
effort called equity index. Based on the literature we analyzed, we are expecting that the 
amalgamations lead to a fiscal effort that is fairer, and the de-amalgamation has the opposite 
effect. This research will attempt to determine whether it is the case.  
Even though both convergence concepts are strongly related, the β-convergence is considered a 
necessary, yet insufficient, condition for the narrowing of the distribution over time (Young and 
al. 2007). In other words, it is possible that the β-convergence happens when σ-convergence is 
not observed. This is why it is important to consider both measures in our analysis.  
2.4 Efficiency 
The efficiency in the production of local public services has been studied and reviewed in many 
articles. Martin and Hock Schiff (2011) have synthesized the methodology and the results on over 
fifty studies on the subject. In those studies, efficiency was a reduction of the cost for a same 
level of services or an improvement in the delivery of services. The general idea of the synthesis 
is that there are many studies that don’t finds any improvement of efficiency; some find a gain 
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and several find mixed results. Hence, there are no obvious conclusions to be drawn. Table 2 
summarizes two empirical studies on amalgamation.  
Table 2: Summary of research on efficiency with amalgamation of local government. 
Authors and 
years 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Region and 
Years 
Method use 
for regression Efficiency 
Edwards 
and Xiao 
(2009) 
Total 
expenditure 
per capita 
-Annexation variable 
-Density 
-Income 
-Source of revenue of 
the municipality 
-Demographic 
variables 
 952 U.S. cities 
1992-2002 
Maximum 
likelihood  
Annexation 
decreases 
total 
spending 
per capita 
Faulk and 
Grassmueck 
(2012) 
Total 
expenditure 
per capita 
-Consolidation 
variable 
-Local government 
characteristic 
-Median household 
income  
-Population 
62 
communities 
1970-2002 in 
U.S.  
Ordinary last 
square 
No effect of 
the 
annexation 
Source: Table made by the author.  
 
For our study, we will use an ordinary least square regression explaining the variation of the total 
spending per capita with explanatory variables, which can be found in Table 2. We do not expect 
to find a significant effect of the structural changes on efficiency. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Municipal Data for the Montreal Metropolitan Region 
The database used in this study is constructed with financial data available from the Quebec 
Ministry of Municipal affairs (Ministère des Affaires municipales, des Régions et de l’Occupation 
du territoire du Québec – MAMROT), and also from financial reports produced by the 
municipalities and the boroughs. The territory analysed in this research refers to the actual 
Montreal Metropolitan Community (MMC). It comprises 3.7 million in 2013 residents over an 
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area of 4,360 km2.  5 We can see a representation of this territory on Map 1. It encompasses 82 
municipalities and the central city, Montréal, is represented with an M. The data was collected on 
an annual basis from 1996 to 2011. For a few of the observations, an adjustment to make data 
comparable for every year is necessary due to the frequent structural changes and modifications 
of the accounting perimeter. The database is completed with socio-economic indicators from the 
Canadian censii of 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011, with the Cansim dataset of Statistic Canada and 
the Québec’s Statistic Institute. 
Map 1: Montreal Metropolitan Community in 2013 
 
                        Source: Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal (www.cmm.qc.ca). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the period studied goes from 1996 to 2011, and is divided 
in three phases. The first is the one before the reforms, and its span is from 1996 to 2001. The 
second period is characterized by the municipal mergers and the structure’s consolidation, and 
goes from 2002 to 2005. We adjust the data of the Canadian’s census of 2001 and 2006 to match 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5http://cmm.qc.ca/who-are-we/establishment/ 
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with the years of interest. Finally, the third period is the one where demergers occurred, from 
2006 to 2011. The three periods will be referred to by their three final years, which are 2001, 
2005 and 2011. 
It was necessary to do a few adjustments to the data. First, all monetary amounts were converted 
in 1996 dollars using consumer price index of Statistic Canada6, so inflation does not affect ours 
results.  Second, with the data from the MAMROT, some observations were missing in the data. 
For every missing observation we have done one out of two manipulations. If the data was 
between two observable years, we use the average of both of them. For the one in 1996 or 2011, 
it was preferable to have the exact same amount to the year before or after than calculates the 
variation between the observable data between 1997-2011 or 1996-2010, because of the structural 
changes that occur in many municipalities. Third, we only have 4 observations for the period 
between 1996 and 2011 from the Canadian census. We had to generate data for every year 
because there is no observation in the 2005 period. Hence, we have distributed the variation 
equally between two observations. This also applies to the data concerning employment and 
average personal income between 1996 and 2006, as well as in the 2006-2011 period. For 
example, if the employment is 100 in 1996 and 120 in 2001, we calculate 104 in 1997, 108 in 
1998 and so on. Afterward, averages for the 3 periods were calculated. The data on the 
population is from the MAMROT, where annual data was available for every municipality. 
In Table 3, we can see the number of municipalities in the three periods. The actual number of 
municipalities in the first period is 106 but we have to drop 6 of them due to various reasons7, 
and this is also why we have 79 in the last period and not 82, the actual number in the MMC. The 
complete list is in Appendix 1, as are the reason why some of the municipalities were dropped. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l02/cst01/econ46a-fra.htm 
7 Merge prior 2002, no population or to many missing data. You can fin the detail in the appendix 1. 
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The number diminishes and after increases because between the two first periods, municipalities 
merge, and some of them demerge afterward. 
Table 3: Distribution of the municipalities. 
Period Number of Municipalities 
1996-2001 100 
2002-2005 61 
2006-2011 798 
Source: MAMROT, 1996-2011. 
3.2 The Measure of Fiscal Effort 
The measure of fiscal effort is constructed with two variables, which will be used for the 
convergence of the fiscal effort afterward. The first one is the total spending index (SI). The total 
spending (S) is a sum of all the categories of spending by a municipality, which include spending 
on administration, security, hygiene, urban planning, leisure, health, and electricity. The average 
of the total spending weighted by population (P) has been calculated for every year (t) for all the 
municipalities (i). After the observed total spending of every municipality has been divided by 
the weighted average for a given year, we obtain the SI. The SI is one if the spending is equal to 
the average, and more/less than one if spending is superior/inferior to the average. 𝑆𝐼!" = !!"!!"∗!!"!!!! !!"!!!!     𝑇𝐼!" = !!"!!"∗!!"!!!! !!"!!!!                                                 (1) 
Hence, this formula gives an indication of the magnitude of the spending compared to the 
weighted average. The second variable is the TGTU9 index (TI). The TGTU (T) stands for the 
standardized global taxation rate and is an indicator of the tax effort required by the 
municipalities standardized by the valuation of the taxable properties with their real values. In 
other words, the TGTU is the ratio of the income from taxes related to property over the 
assessment of taxable properties standardized to make it comparable between municipalities. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8There are actually 19 demergers, and not 79-61=18, because we dropped l’Ile Dorval.  
9Taux global de taxation uniformisée which means global standardized tax rate.  
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TI index is built the same way as SI, in which the TGTU divided by the average of the TGTU 
weighted by the population for a corresponding year. The TI indicates the tax effort for a 
municipality compare to the average for a given year. The measure of fiscal effort is the equity 
index (EI). The EI is the ratio of TI on SI. An EI superior to one means that the tax effort is more 
important relative to its corresponding spending; the inverse situation yields an EI inferior to one. 𝐸𝐼!" = !"!"!"!"                                                                     (2) 
Here’s an example for Montreal in 2001: 
𝐸𝐼!"#$%&'(,!""# = !,!"!,!"#!"##,!"!"!#,!" = 1,221,38 = 0,88 
The interpretation of the 0,88 is that Montreal, in 2001, has a greater total spending compare to 
the average than it fiscal effort. We can see in Table 4 the average of the EI for the three periods. 
In the second column, the average EI is always superior to 1, which means that the fiscal effort 
over the average of the population’s fiscal effort is greater than the total spending on the average 
of the population’s total spending. We wanted to have two points of view in the initial and the 
second column; the first taking into consideration the size of the city, and the second, every city 
is equal in the analysis. The subsequent columns aren’t weighted by population. Montreal has a 
major impact in the weight because it accounts for more than 30% of the total population in the 
metropolitan area every year, and if we add Laval and Longueuil, this percentage goes up to 45%. 
Moreover, the standard deviation is getting low, and higher after, but it does not mean there isn’t 
convergence in the period itself. The three last columns present the separated average depending 
on the exclusive structural status of the municipality. Therefore, a municipality cannot be present 
in more than one of these three columns at the same time in a given period. However, 
municipalities can be grouped with merger, which means that the municipality has merged, 
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demerger, which means that the city has demerged, or neither. For the 2002-2005 period, the EI 
for the merged municipalities is similar to municipalities that haven’t had a structural change. For 
the 2006-2011 period, the average of the EI is higher for the merger and a lot lower for the 
demergers, and on average, it has reduced from the previous period. The 5 lowest and the 5 
highest EI for the municipalities for every period are found in Appendix A. We can note that 
Montreal, once merged, is in the bottom five. It is the territory that has received most of the 
merged municipalities, and in the final period, both extremes contain demerged cities. Within the 
period, the distribution doesn’t change a lot, but it does change when the shocks of the merger 
and the demerger happen.  
Table 4: Equity index between 1996-2011 for the population in the CMM area. 
Period Weighted average Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Average 
Without 
Merger or 
Demerger 
Average 
for 
Merger 
Average for 
Demerger 
1996-2001 1,10 1,22 0,41 1,22   
2002-2005 1,00 1,50 0,35 1,50 1,51  
2006-2011 1,00 1,39 0,40 1,48 1,61 1,09 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT 
 
The measure of fiscal effort presented here assumes that a fair distribution of spending among 
municipalities should be proportional to the resident population, which is denoted as the normal 
population. However, in a metropolitan context, some municipalities have a day population larger 
than their normal population since they are employment centers. Thus, spending in these 
municipalities will exceed resident population needs. In this case, a fair distribution of spending 
among municipalities should also consider the effect of day population. To do so, a second 
measure of fiscal effort has been computed. Assuming that the number of residents combined to 
the number of employees working in the municipality can take into account particularities of the 
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employment centers, which can more accurately reflect the number of users of public services in 
a municipality, we have:  𝐷𝑎𝑦  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
You can find the 5 lowest and 5 highest proportions of the normal on the day population in 
Appendix A. A high proportion doesn’t demonstrate a lot of employment; therefore, a city with a 
high proportion is not an employment center. In general, the municipalities with high populations 
are employment centers. The data of the number of worker are taken from the Canadian’s census. 
The calculations for the equation (1), (2) and (3) where made for both populations, which is the 𝑃!" that vary in (1) but has a repercussion to (2) and (3). 
3.3 Measuring σ and β Convergence 
The σ convergence and β convergence of the equity index can be measured to verify if the fiscal 
effort converges in each the three periods.  
To calculate the variation over time of the dispersion of EI, the σ convergence is calculated with 
the mean (µ) and the standard variation (σ) of EI for every year. Accordingly, the coefficient of 
variation is calculated for every year, giving the σ convergence. It is the same idea of the 
economic convergence as used by Quah (1993), but applied to our measure of fiscal effort: 𝐶𝑉! =    !!!!,                                                                         (3)  
Moreover, we want to know, in every period, if there is a β convergence, which is the presence of 
a negative correlation between the initial value and the growth rate (Baumol, 1986). In other 
words, we want to verify if the initial value of the equity index relates to the magnitude of the 
growth rate in the subsequent year. Base on the model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), we will 
measure if there is β convergence, and if yes, at what rate. Assuming that  𝐸𝐼!,! is our level of 
	   17	  
local fiscal effort for the municipality i in year t, we can estimate the β convergence with the 
fallow equation: ln !"!,!!"!,! (1 𝑇)   = 𝐴 − 𝐵   𝑙n(𝐸𝐼!,!) 𝑇 + 𝜀!                                        (4) 
Where 0 and T represent the initial and the final year of each period, respectively, and 𝜀! the error 
term. The regressions are made for the normal population and the day population. If B is 
significant in the regression, we can calculate the rate of β convergence resolving: 𝐵 = (1− 𝑒!!")                                                               (5) 
3.4 Measuring Efficiency 
To validate if the mergers and demergers have affected the efficiency of municipalities, we 
assume that a loss (or gain) in efficiency can be measured by an increase (or decrease) of dollars 
spent on municipalities’ administrative costs. We will estimate regressions on two variables. The 
first variable is the growth rate of the administrative spending  𝐴𝑆!, and the second is the growth 
rate of the total municipal spending 𝑇𝑆!.  Both variables are calculated in average for each period 
with the geometric average, with Z standing for each period; 2001, 2005 and 2011: 
𝐴𝑆! = !"!,!!"!,!! − 1    ,        𝑇𝑆! = !"!,!!"!,!! − 1.                                           (6) 
Two ordinary last square regressions are estimated, one on 𝐴𝑆!, and the other on 𝑇𝑆!. The 
regressions are inspired by the works of  Edwards and Xiao (2009) and Faulk and Grassmueck 
(2012), which look at the total local spending on explanatory variables, and here, we are looking 
at the growth rate of spending. They are estimated for the three periods Z with different models 
for each period. The first regression (7) verify if the variation of the administrative spending 
follow closely the variation of the total spending.  𝐴𝑆! = 𝐴 + 𝑇𝑆! +𝑀 + 𝐷 + 𝜀.                                                      (7) 
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The dummy M is 1 if the municipality is amalgamated, and 0 in the contrary. The variable D is 1 
if the municipality has demerged and recovered its autonomy or if the municipality has lost 
territory because other one left, like Montreal for example, and 0 otherwise.  If M or D are 
significant, the variation of the administrative spending are affected by structural changes, this is 
probably due to a lost of efficiency or the cost of the change of the structure. We can see the 
distribution of the variables in table 5.  
Table 5: Growth rate of the variables in the three periods 
Period Z 2001 2005 2011 
Growth rate AS 3,73% 4,61% 6,2% 
Growth rate TS 0,99% 5,55% 10,0% 
Growth rate population 1,41% 0,67% 1,3% 
Growth rate employment 5,54% -2,10% 0,64% 
Growth rate average personal 
income 1,08% 0,65% 1,1% 
Merger 0,00% 11,48% 7,6% 
Demerger 0,00% 0,00% 25,32% 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistic Canada 
 
We can see that both AS and TS are increasing with each period, but this does not imply it must 
necessarily be due to the merger and demerger. The other variables vary in both direction from 
period to period. The Merger and the Demerger columns in Table 5 represent the share of the 
sample that has those dummies in each period.  
The second regression (8) verifies if total expenditure growth follows characteristic of the 
population and is affected by mergers and demergers. The 𝐶! is a vector of control variables 
including population growth rate, employment, and average revenue in 1996 dollars. These 
control variables are computed from census data from Statistic Canada. Regression equations are: 𝑇𝑆! = 𝐴 + 𝐶! +𝑀 + 𝐷 + 𝜀.                                                (8) 
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From the literature we studied, we do not expect any particular effect on the efficiency measured 
on the growth rate of the total spending and the administrative spending. We think that spending 
will be mostly explained by the population variables.  
4 Results 
4.1 Convergence and Equity 
The σ-convergence for the equity index has been calculated and the results appear in Figure 1. 
Those figures present the evolution of the coefficient of variation of EI (cv) over time. A higher 
cv means a wider spread of the distribution. Convergence (or divergence) is observed with the 
decrease (or the increase) of cv over the period. The periods need to be commented separately 
because mergers and demergers were two exogenous shocks, and produce steps in the evolution 
of the cv. Keeping in mind that the solid line represents the normal population and the dotted line 
represents the day population, we can note that they demonstrate practically the same changes 
from year to year. But, interestingly, the cv level is lower when we take in consideration the 
employment.  
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Figure 1: Coefficient of variation for the Equity Index in the Montreal area 
 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistic Canada  
 
During the first period, 1996-2001, the cv varies little and there is no noticeable σ-convergence. 
Afterward, the shock of the merger is observed through a decrease of the cv, which attests to a 
fairer fiscal effort between municipalities. In the second period, the cv doesn’t change over the 
same period. It is interesting to note that we observe no significant shock in Figure 1 between 
2005 and 2006, the second and the last period, because we could have expected one considering 
the shock between 2001 and 2002. Finally, in the 2005-2011 period, the cv tends to increase, 
although, the tendency is not clear. However, that aspect will be clarified in the next section. 
The results of the β-convergence of the equity index are found in Table 6, and the correlations of 
the regressions are in Appendix B. 
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Table 6: Regression on the day population for β convergence by O.L.S. 
Year Population Constant Impact of 
the initial 
value 
# of observation R-squared 
2001 
Day 0,005 
(0,237) 
-0,09 
(0,135) 99 
0,02 
Normal 0,004 
(0,334) 
0,038 
(0,318) 0,01 
2005 
Day 0,004 
(0,503) 
-0,06 
(0,339) 60 
0,02 
Normal 0,014 
(0,024) 
-0,05 
(0,374) 0,01 
2011 
Day 0,002 
(0,755) 
-0,66 
(0,000) 79 
0,22 
Normal -0,011 
(0,334) 
0,046 
(0,768) 0,01 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT. The () is the p-value. 
 
The ordinary last squared regressions were estimated for each period and both populations. 
Regressions were robust, except day-2001 and day-2005, because they didn’t pass Breush-
Pagan’s test at 5% (see Appendix C). A negative coefficient of the variable impact of the initial 
value means that a higher initial value is associated with a lower growth rate of the equity index, 
which signals convergence of the fiscal effort. If the coefficients are positive, it means 
divergence of the equity index, but it is not the case here.  
As for the σ-convergence, the first period doesn’t converge, nor is a β-convergence observable in 
the 2002-2005 period, when the mergers occurred. Both populations’ coefficients aren’t 
statistically significant. In Table 7, the annual rate of convergence of the fiscal effort, or the 
speed of convergence, is calculated, where the B column is the coefficient of the variable of 
Impact of the initial value in Table 6. In the last period, from 2006 to 2011, the coefficient isn’t 
significant for the normal population, but is at 1% for the day population. Therefore, the 
contradictory result for both populations makes the convergence unclear for this period. Thus, 
the annual rate of convergence stands between 0 % and 18% for this period. If we compare our 
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coefficient to the literature, it is slightly higher. This difference might be explained by the fact 
that these coefficients are associated to local fiscal effort, and not to state or national fiscal effort.   
Table 7:  B coefficient and convergence rate β  
Year Population B β 
2001 
Day 0 0 
Normal 0 0 
2005 
Day 0 0 
Normal 0 0 
2011 
Day .66 18% 
Normal 0 0 
Source: calculations by the author 
 
With the results of convergence of fiscal effort, we can make conclusions on the impact on 
equity. What equity means for a municipality is the fact that it can set a tax rate proportional to 
its spending, which is the fiscal effort. For example, if a municipality has exactly the average tax 
rate in the metropolitan region but has only half of the spending compare to the average, it pays 
too much for what it gets. Hence, with both types of convergence, we know how the equity 
varies in every period. In the length of time for the first period, we can’t say that it become more 
equal or unequal. Perhaps if we had picked a longer period, we could have had a variation of the 
equity. Afterwards, the mergers had a strong impact on the distribution of the equity and reduced 
it.  During the subsequent year, we can’t observe that it’s getting fairer with every year. The final 
year, when there are demergers, the equity is not clearly affected by the structural changes.   
4.2 Spending and Efficiency  
Two regressions were made to study the variations of the growth rate of the spending 
considering the structural changes in the municipalities.  
The results of the first regression concerning administrative spending appear in Table 8. The 
regression did not needed to be robust because they did pass Breush-Pagan’s test at 5% (see 
	   23	  
Appendix C). It is the regression of administrative spending growth over total spending growth, 
with dummies for merged and demerged municipalities. Here, we try to identify whether the 
structural changes have an effect, in terms of increasing or a decreasing administrative spending 
growth rate. We can see in the results that the variable of the total spending is always significant 
at 1%, and is a major determinant of the growth of the administrative spending (refer to the 
correlation table in Appendix B). Moreover, there is no statistically significant effect of the 
merger or the demerger on the growth rate of the administrative spending.  
Table 8: Regression on growth rate of administrative spending by O.L.S. 
Period Constant Growth rate 
Total spending 
Merger Demerger # of observation R-squared 
2001 0,032 (0,000) 
0,49 
(0,000) 
  100 0,18 
2005 
0,028 
(0,002) 
0,27 
(0,026) 
0,023 
(0,202) 
 
61 
0,11 
0,031 
(0,001) 
0,27 
(0,029) 
  0,08 
2011 
-0,01 
(0,248) 
0,61 
(0,000) 
-0,008 
(0,693) 
0,008 
(0,675) 79 
0,39 
-0,004 
(0,688) 
0,66 
(0,000) 
  0,38 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistic Canada. The () is the p-value.  
 
The second regression is total spending growth over population’s variable with dummies for 
mergers and demergers, the results are in Table 9. The first and second regressions were robust 
because they didn’t pass Breush-Pagan’s test at 5% (see Appendix C). The regressions verify 
whether the variation of total spending relies on the structural changes of the municipality when 
population characteristics are taken into consideration. Our first observation is that most of the 
variables are not significant. Then, the merger variable isn’t significant in either of the second 
and third regression. Moreover, the last regression has demerger significant at 1%, and it means 
that the growth rate of the total spending is 9,3% higher for the demerged municipalities.  
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Table 9: Regression of growth rate of total spending by O.L.S.  
Period Constant Growth rate 
population 
Growth rate 
employment 
Growth 
rate 
income 
Merger Demerger # of observation R-squared 
2001 0,001 (0,789) 
0,22 
(0,294) 
0,09 
(0,101) 
0,05 
(0,600) 
  100 0,07 
2005 
0,05 
(0,000) 
-0,15 
(0,734) 
-0,044 
(0,596) 
0,46 
(0,171) 
0,003 
(0,780) 
 
61 
0,02 
0,053 
(0,000) 
-0,14 
(0,796) 
-0,036 
(0,778) 
0,45 
(0,213) 
  0,02 
2011 
0,05 
(0,001) 
0,44 
(0,106) 
0,23 
(0,060) 
1.34 
(0,313) 
-0,004 
(0,754) 
0,093 
(0,000) 79 
0,59 
0,03 
(0,078) 
-0,60 
(0,082) 
0,20 
(0,264) 
5,744 
(0,001) 
  0,16 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistic Canada. The () is the p-value. 
 
Our assumption was that a loss of efficiency due to structural changes could be measured through 
the spending growth rates of the municipalities. At first, we have verified that the merger or the 
demerger does not affect the growth rate of the administrative spending. In other words, we 
checked that the structural changes didn’t add additional administrative cost and didn’t affect the 
efficiency in that term. After that, it can be seen that the growth of the total spending wasn’t 
affected by the merger, but was by demerger. Hence, we can’t conclude that all structural 
changes affect the growth rate of the total spending. The demerged municipalities indeed have a 
higher growth in their total spending, but it does not mean that they are less efficient.  
Those results are coherent with the literature. Martin and Hock Schiff (2011), in their synthesis 
on the efficiency of local government annexation, said that most of the empirical work on the 
matter hasn’t found strong evidence of an increase in the efficiency, which matches ours 
hypothesis.  
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5 Conclusion 	  
The main objective of this research was to verify the existence of fiscal convergence in the 
Montreal area between 1996 and 2011, considering the structural changes that have occurred 
during this period. In addition, the growth rate of administrative and total spending were analysed 
to determine the effect of merger and demerger from the point of view of efficiency.   
The results show that convergence of the fiscal effort did not occur after the merger, between 
2002 and 2005. The results for the demerger are unclear, suggesting a potential convergence rate 
varying between 0% and 18% between 2006 and 2011. Furthermore, we didn’t find any clear 
evidence that structural changes affect the efficiency, as measured by unexplained growth in total 
spending. 
Our results reinforce the conclusion of previous studies concerning institutional reforms at the 
local level. These reforms have little impact in terms of efficiency and equity for metropolitan 
areas. Future initiatives would do better if they focus on policies based on voluntary cooperation 
instead of compulsory amalgamation. 
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Appendix A 
Municipalities’ status of structural changes. (see legend at bottom). 
Number Municipality's name 2001 2005 2011 Reason for X 1996 population 
1 Richelieu    
 3195 
2 Saint-Mathias-sur-Richelieu    
 4014 
3 Chambly    
 19716 
4 Carignan    
 5614 
5 Saint-Basile-le-Grand    
 11771 
6 McMasterville    
 3813 
7 Otterburn Park    
 7320 
8 Saint-Jean-Baptiste    
 2913 
9 Mont-Saint-Hilaire    
 13064 
10 Beloeil    
 19294 
11 Saint-Mathieu-de-Beloeil    
 2143 
12 Brossard  M D 
 65927 
13 Saint-Lambert  M D 
 20971 
14 Boucherville  M D 
 34989 
15 Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville  M D 
 23714 
16 Longueuil  M+ D- 
 127977 
17 Greenfield Park  M  
 17337 
18 LeMoyne  M  
 5052 
19 Saint-Hubert  M  
 77042 
20 Sainte-Julie    
 24030 
21 Saint-Amable    
 7105 
22 Varennes    
 18842 
23 Verchères    
 4854 
24 Calixa-Lavallée    
 467 
25 Contrecoeur    
 5331 
26 Charlemagne    
 5739 
27 Repentigny  M+  
 53824 
28 Le Gardeur  M  
 16853 
29 Saint-Sulpice    
 3307 
30 L'Assomption    
 11366 
31 Saint-Gérard-Majella X X X Merged with 
l’Assomption in 2000 X 
32 Terrebonne  M+  
 42214 
33 Lachenaie  M  
 18489 
34 La Plaine  M  
 14413 
35 Mascouche    
 28097 
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36 Laval    
 330393 
37 Montréal-Est  M D 
 3523 
38 Montréal  M+ D- 
 1016376 
39 Anjou  M  
 37308 
40 Lachine  M  
 35171 
41 LaSalle  M  
 72029 
42 Montréal-Nord  M  
 81581 
43 Outremont  M  
 22571 
44 Pierrefonds  M  
 52986 
45 Roxboro  M  
 5950 
46 Saint-Laurent  M  
 74240 
47 Saint-Léonard  M  
 71327 
48 Sainte-Geneviève  M  
 3339 
49 Verdun  M  
 59714 
50 L'Île Bizard  M  
 13038 
51 Westmount  M D 
 20420 
52 Montréal-Ouest  M D 
 5254 
53 Côte-Saint-Luc  M D 
 29705 
54 Hampstead  M D 
 6986 
55 Mont-Royal  M D 
 18282 
56 Dorval  M D 
 17572 
57 L'Île-Dorval X X X No population X 
58 Pointe-Claire  M D 
 28435 
59 Kirkland  M D 
 18678 
60 Beaconsfield  M D 
 19414 
61 Baie d'Urfé  M D 
 3774 
62 Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue  M D 
 4700 
63 Senneville  M D 
 906 
64 Dollard-des-Ormeaux  M D 
 47826 
65 Saint-Mathieu    
 1925 
66 Saint-Philippe    
 3656 
67 La Prairie    
 17128 
68 Candiac    
 11805 
69 Delson    
 6703 
70 Sainte-Catherine    
 13724 
71 Saint-Constant    
 21933 
72 Saint-Isidore    
 2401 
73 Mercier    
 9059 
74 Châteauguay    
 41423 
75 Léry    
 2410 
76 Beauharnois  M+  
 6435 
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77 Maple Grove  M  
 2606 
78 Melocheville  M  
 2486 
79 Les Cèdres    
 4641 
80 Pointe-des-Cascades    
 910 
81 L'Île-Perrot    
 9178 
82 Notre-Dame-de-l'Île-Perrot    
 7059 
83 Pincourt    
 10023 
84 Terrasse-Vaudreuil    
 1977 
85 Vaudreuil-Dorion    
 18466 
86 Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac    
 28435 
87 
L'Île-Cadieux 
X X X 
No data on the 
population X 
88 Hudson X X X Too many data missing X 
89 Saint-Lazare    
 928 
90 Saint-Eustache    
 11193 
91 Deux-Montagnes    
 39848 
92 Sainte-Marthe-sur-le-Lac    
 15953 
93 Pointe-Calumet    
 8295 
94 Saint-Joseph-du-Lac    
 5443 
95 Oka - Municipalité    
 4930 
96 
Oka - Paroisse 
X X X 
Merged with Oka in 
1999 X 
97 Boisbriand    
 25227 
98 Sainte-Thérèse    
 23477 
99 Blainville    
 29603 
100 Rosemère    
 12025 
101 Lorraine    
 8876 
102 Bois-des-Filion    
 7124 
103 Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines    
 12908 
104 Mirabel    
 22689 
105 Saint-Pierre  M  
 374 
106 
Notre-Dame-de-Bon-Secours 
X X X 
Merged with 
Richelieu in 2000 X 
Source: MAMROT between 1996-2011. 
M=Merger, M+=the city received a new part of territory 
D=Demerger, D-=the municipality lost a part of territory 
X=the data was removed 
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Top 5 and Bottom 5 Equity Indexes for each period. 
Period Ranking Name Merger Demerger EI population (in thousand) 
1996-2001 
Bottom 5 
Montréal-Est 0 0 0,20 3,58 
Westmount 0 0 0,26 20,32 
Senneville 0 0 0,30 0,93 
Dorval 0 0 0,34 17,45 
Mont-Royal 0 0 0,40 18,31 
Top 5 
La Plaine 0 0 1,86 14,26 
Saint-Amable 0 0 1,91 7,00 
LeMoyne 0 0 1,98 5,32 
Charlemagne 0 0 2,08 6,03 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 2,14 5,45 
2002-2005 
Bottom 5 
Rosemère 0 0 0,82 13,92 
Montréal 1 0 0,82 1852,48 
Saint-Mathieu-de-Beloeil 0 0 0,89 2,29 
Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac 0 0 0,90 0,95 
Mirabel 0 0 0,94 29,16 
Top 5 
Saint-Sulpice 0 0 1,96 3,57 
Saint-Constant 0 0 2,01 23,60 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 2,28 5,83 
Charlemagne 0 0 2,31 5,86 
Saint-Amable 0 0 2,44 7,60 
2006-2011 
Bottom 5 
Montréal-Est 0 1 0,34 3,85 
Westmount 0 1 0,47 20,32 
Dorval 0 1 0,69 18,30 
Senneville 0 1 0,78 0,99 
Rosemère 0 0 0,80 14,32 
Top 5 
L'Île-Perrot 0 0 1,98 10,14 
Beauharnois 1 0 2,00 12,07 
Saint-Amable 0 0 2,12 8,69 
Dollard-des-Ormeaux 0 1 2,28 50,05 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 2,35 6,55 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistics Canada 
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Top 5 and Bottom 5 Municipalities by periods of the normal population on the day population (in 
%) 
Period Ranking Name Merger Demerger Normal population on day population 
1996-
2001 
Bottom 5 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 0,95 
Pointe-des-Cascades 0 0 0,95 
Saint-Sulpice 0 0 0,93 
Notre-Dame-de-l'Île-
Perrot 0 0 0,93 
Otterburn Park 0 0 0,92 
Top 5 
Senneville 0 0 0,49 
Mont-Royal 0 0 0,49 
Pointe-Claire 0 0 0,48 
Montréal-Est 0 0 0,38 
Dorval 0 0 0,32 
2002-
2005 
Bottom 5 
Pointe-des-Cascades 0 0 0,96 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 0,95 
Otterburn Park 0 0 0,94 
Calixa-Lavallée 0 0 0,93 
Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac 0 0 0,93 
Top 5 
Montréal 1 0 0,70 
Mirabel 0 0 0,69 
Delson 0 0 0,68 
Saint-Mathieu-de-
Beloeil 0 0 0,67 
Contrecoeur 0 0 0,66 
2006-
2011 
Bottom 5 
Vaudreuil-sur-le-Lac 0 0 0,98 
Pointe-des-Cascades 0 0 0,98 
Pointe-Calumet 0 0 0,97 
Otterburn Park 0 0 0,96 
Saint-Philippe 0 0 0,95 
Top 5 
Mont-Royal 0 1 0,51 
Baie d'Urfé 0 1 0,48 
Montréal-Est 0 1 0,38 
Senneville 0 1 0,34 
Dorval 0 1 0,30 
Source: calculations by the author using data from MAMROT and Statistics Canada 
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7.2 Appendix B 
 
Correlation for the day population for β convergence 
 
2001 2005 2011 
 
In. Value In. Value In. Value 
Av. Var. -0,15 -0,13 -0,47 
 
 
Correlation for the normal population for β convergence 
 
2001 2005 2011 
 
In. Value In. Value In. Value 
Av. Var. 0,10 -0,11 0,08 
 
 
Correlation to verify efficiency for 3 periods.  
2001  g.r.admin g.r.total g.r.pop g.r.empl g.r.income 
g.r.admin 1.0000     
g.r.total 0.4214 1.0000    
g.r.pop 0.2425 0.2095 1.0000   
g.r.empl 0.1463 0.2124 0.2640 1.0000  
g.r.income 0.0574 0.0148 0.1727 0.0496 1.0000 
 
2005  g.r.admin g.r.total g.r.pop g.r.empl g.r.income merger 
g.r.admin 1.0000      
g.r.total 0.2804 1.0000     
g.r.pop 0.1249 -0.0375 1.0000    
g.r.empl 0.1410 -0.0380 0.1453 1.0000   
g.r.income 0.0182 0.1398 0.1522 0.0183 1.0000  
merger 0.1548 -0.0197 0.2525 0.4468 0.0069 1.0000 
 
 
2011  g.r.admin g.r.total g.r.pop g.r.empl g.r.income merger demerger 
g.r.admin 1.0000       
g.r.total 0.7898 1.0000      
g.r.pop -0.0525 -0.1013 1.0000     
g.r.empl 0.0624 0.0899 -0.0872 1.0000    
g.r.income 0.3353 0.2864 0.1220 -0.0305 1.0000   
merger -0.1516 -0.1108 0.0188 0.2289 -0.0373 1.0000  
demerger 0.6340 0.7267 -0.4184 -0.0092 0.3005 -0.1669 1.0000 
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7.5 Appendix C 
 
Breush-Pagan’s test for the regression on the day population for β convergence by O.L.S. 
Period Population Prob > chi2  
2001 Day 0.0114 Normal  0.5678 
2005 Day 0.0322 Normal  0.1633 
2011 Day 0.5834 Normal  0.1027 
 
Breush-Pagan’s test for the regression on growth rate of administrative spending by O.L.S. 
Period Regressions Prob > chi2  
2001  0.0386 
2005 With merger 0.0058  0.0047 
2011 With merger and demerger 0.0000  0.0000 
 
Breush-Pagan’s test for the regression on growth rate of total spending by O.L.S. 
Period Regressions Prob > chi2  
2001  0.4155 
2005 With merger 0.0521  0.0394 
2011 With merger and demerger 0.0000  0.0001 
 
 
 
